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ABSTRACT 
Recent election outcomes in Europe and beyond reflect a growing scepticism 
of open borders among the public. From the Brexit vote in the United 
Kingdom to the election of Donald Trump in the United States, rhetoric that is 
critical of the organizations facilitating policy cooperation and learning across 
borders as well as international trade and migration is popular among a 
growing segment of the electorate. Are these recent developments part of a 
larger trend of party and electoral change? By focusing on changing patterns 
in party and electoral competition in the Netherlands, this article suggests 
that they are. Relying on expert and voter data, it argues that party and 
electoral politics in the Netherlands is increasingly characterized by both an 
economic left-right as well as a cosmopolitan-parochial divide. While the 
former relates to issues of state intervention into the economy, the second 
refers to stances on European integration, migration and national control in 
international affairs. This cosmopolitan-parochial divide has become largely 
independent of the economic left-right dimension, and influences people’s 
voting decisions independently of their left-right views. Interestingly, the 
cosmopolitan-parochial divide in the Netherlands should not necessarily be 
understood as a cultural backlash, but rather seems a reflection of increased 
economic insecurity. Although the evidence stems from the Dutch case, I 
suggest that the cosmopolitan-parochial divide is a useful lens through which 
we can understand political change in Europe more generally.  
 
KEY WORDS Political parties, public opinion, political dimensionality, 
European integration, European politics, immigration, the Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Election outcomes in the aftermath of the Great Recession in Europe and 
beyond seem to demonstrate a rising scepticism of open borders among the 
public. The electoral gains of populist parties and the Brexit vote in the United 
Kingdom to the election of Donald Trump in the United States suggest that 
rhetoric critical of migration, trade deals and international organizations is 
becoming increasingly popular with a growing segment of the electorate. The 
question on the minds of many experts of American and European politics is 
if these developments are part of a larger trend of party and electoral change, 
or if they merely represent short upsets from a more or less stable political 
equilibrium.  
This question has become even more important in light of the electoral 
triumph of the centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron in France over his 
populist right rival, Marine Le Pen, and outcome of the Dutch election in 2017 
where the Conservative liberal party of Prime Minister Mark Rutte was able 
to fight off the challenge of the populist right political entrepreneur Geert 
Wilders. These election outcomes were viewed by many as victories for 
moderate forces, and as signs that the rise of populism could be halted. For 
example French president Emmanuel Macron (at that time still a candidate) 
stated that “[t]he Netherlands is showing us that a breakthrough for the 
extreme right is not a foregone conclusion and that progressives are gaining 
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momentum.”1 By relying on expert and voter data from the Netherlands, this 
article suggests that these types of conclusions are somewhat premature. They 
fail to recognize the long-term change that party competition and elections 
have undergone in Europe since the 1990s.  
This article suggests that there are important lessons to be learned for 
our understanding of European politics from the changes in Dutch politics. It 
highlights three empirical trends. First, while the traditional economic left-
right dimension is of continued importance in the Netherlands, we have 
witnessed the growing significance of other issues, most notably those 
relating to questions of migration, European integration and international 
cooperation, for both parties and voters. Second, party and voter polarization 
over these issues has not only become increasingly linked, but also more 
distinct from polarization on the economic left-right. I suggest that Dutch 
politics has become characterized by second dimension, that I coin the 
cosmopolitan-parochial divide.2 This divide pits cosmopolitan parties and voters 
on both the left and right advocating an inclusionary and international 
outlook, like the Dutch Green Left or Democrats 66 for example, against 
parochial parties and voters on both the left and right that are increasingly 
                                                        
1 See http://www.euronews.com/2017/03/16/sighs-of-relief-in-europe-at-
dutch-election-result (accessed 19th of April 2017). 
2 Note that Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) refer to a similar set of issues as the 
integration-demarcation dimension and Hooghe and Marks (2017) to a 
transnational cleavage. I outline the differences from these existing 
approaches in later sections. 
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wary of open borders and international influences, such as the Dutch Socialist 
Party or the Party for Freedom. Both positions on the economic left-right 
dimension and cosmopolitanism-parochialism divide now structure people’s 
party choice in European and national parliamentary elections in the 
Netherlands. Third and finally, contrary to recent studies that view the second 
dimension as largely cultural in nature involving a popular backlash against 
cultural liberalism (most notably Inglehart and Norris 2011, 2016), I show that 
this is not necessarily the case in the Netherlands. The more likely driving 
force seems to be economic insecurity (see Hacker 2006, Hacker et al. 2013). 
 The findings presented here have important implications for our 
understanding of party and electoral competition in the Netherlands as well 
as in Europe more broadly. Three in particular stand out. First, the evidence 
suggests that the outcome of the 2017 election in the Netherlands, and others 
in Europe after that, by no means signifies that the populist surge has been 
halted. Rather it indicates that more competition between cosmopolitan and 
parochial political forces may lie ahead in future elections. Second, parochial 
positions can be found on both the left and right of the political spectrum, 
amongst voters of the Dutch Party for Freedom as well as Socialist Party as 
well as cosmopolitan ones, the Green Left and Democrats 66 for example. 
Third, this analysis provides important insights for the understanding the 
developments in other European party systems. For one, the content of the 
second dimension is likely to be highly context-specific, where in the 
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Netherlands opposition to cultural liberalism is not the core of the second 
dimension, in other European countries it might be. Second, the Dutch 
findings may be most indicative of trends in other systems where electoral 
thresholds are low. These contexts most likely allows for the development of 
largely orthogonal second represented by a diverse set of political parties.  
 This article is structured as follows. First, it outlines the key results of 
the 2017 Dutch election result and suggests why they matter. Next, it 
examines the development of party positions on key policy issues in the 
Netherlands. The third part examines the dimensionality of Dutch public 
opinion. The fourth and final section concludes and discusses the implications 
for our understanding of party and electoral competition in Europe. 
 
2. Beyond the Left-Right? The 2017 Dutch Election 
 
The anti-immigrant and anti-EU political entrepreneur Geert Wilders set the 
bar high for the 2017 election in the Netherlands. At the start of the European 
election season of 2017, elections in France, the United Kingdom, Germany 
and Austria were to follow; he aimed to ‘unleash a populist patriotic spring’.3 
It turned out to be different. Although his party gained five seats and Prime 
Minister Rutte’s party lost, Wilders did not meet his expectation for the 
                                                        
3 See http://www.ft.com/content/287fefe8-e098-11e6-8405-9e5580d6e5fb 
(accessed 19th of April 2017). 
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election. His Party for Freedom (Partij van de Vrijheid, PVV) did not become 
the largest party. One of the biggest winners of the election was the Green 
Left (Groen Links, GL) party. Its leader, the 31-year-old Jesse Klaver had been 
able to infuse a sense of optimism in the campaign. His message focused on 
sustainability, inclusion and an overall international outlook. The Liberal 
Democratic D66 (Democraten 66) party mobilized similar issues that led to 
gains at the polls. Table 1 provides an overview of seat changes in 2017 
compared to the 2012 national parliamentary election. 
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Table 1: 2017 Dutch Parliamentary Election Results 
Party Name Number of Seats 
(150 in total) 
Change from 2012 
Election 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie (VVD) 
33 -8 
Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(PVV) 
20 +5 
Christen Democratisch 
Appel (CDA) 
19 +6 
Democraten 66  
(D66) 
19 +7 
Groen Left 
(GL) 
14 +10 
Socialistische Partij 
(SP) 
14 -1 
Partij van de Arbeid 
(PvdA) 
9 -29 
Christen Unie 
(CU) 
5 0 
Partij van de Dieren 
(PvdD) 
5 +3 
50plus 4 +2 
DENK 3 +3 
Staatskundig 
Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) 
3 0 
Forum voor Democratie 
(FvD) 
2 +2 
Source: These results are based on the official final results released by the Kiesraad on the 21st 
of March 2017. 
 
The Conservative Liberal party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie, VVD) of Prime Minister Mark Rutte, lost, but did much better 
than the polls had suggested. Its coalition partner the Labour Party (Partij van 
de Arbeid, PvdA) experienced a historic loss. The party lost 29 seats and 
became the 7th party in the Dutch political landscape. The election also saw 
seats gains for two new parties, DENK and the Forum for Democracy (Forum 
voor Democratie, FvD). The latter is a fierce anti-EU party, while the former is 
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a pro-immigrant party founded by two former parliamentarians of the 
Labour party from Turkish heritage who disagreed with the harsher tone on 
immigration of the party in recent years.4  
The election result was largely viewed in the international media as a 
victory for moderate forces. This is perhaps not quite an accurate description 
of the outcome. Indeed, progressive forces like the GL and D66 gained, but 
mostly at the expense of the PvdA. Equally important for the result was that 
the VVD as well as Christian Democrats (Christen Democratisch Appel, CDA) 
pandered towards Wilders’ anti-immigrant and anti-EU message. For 
example, on the 23rd of January Prime Minister Mark Rutte in an 
unprecedented move placed an ad directed to all Dutch people in the big 
national newspapers. The tone of the ad was harsh. ‘Newcomers’ as the prime 
minister called them were told to comply with Dutch norms or values or 
‘otherwise bugger off’ (Rutte 2017). Wilders’ party might not have become the 
biggest political force, but many of his stances have become part-and-parcel 
of the political mainstream on the right.  
 The election result can be seen as significant in two respects. First, it 
signifies the tremendous fragmentation of the Dutch political landscape. 
Thirteen parties are represented in parliament and a governing coalition 
needs to consist of at least four parties. This makes the task of governing and 
drafting and passing legislation through parliament extremely tricky. Second, 
                                                        
4 For more information see: https://www.bewegingdenk.nl/. 
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the outcome signifies the dwindling of mainstream political forces, like the 
Labour Party for example, that have given way to the rise of parties that 
mobilize on other issues than the economic left-right, such as immigration, 
the environment or the EU. Moreover, many new parties have quite 
distinctive issue profiles focusing on animal’s rights or the interests of the 
elderly for example. These consequences of more fragmentation and the 
growing significance of issues beyond the left-right are indicative of larger 
trends in the Dutch political landscape that started in the late 1990s. This is 
the topic this study turns to next.  
 
3. Party Positioning in the Netherlands beyond the Left-Right: The 
Cosmopolitan-Parochial Divide 
 
Party competition, at least in advanced industrial democracies in Europe, is 
generally perceived to consist of two dimensions (see De Vries and Marks 
2012 for an overview). Scholars use a variety of terms to denote these two 
dimensions, the materialism versus post-materialism (Inglehart 1990), the old 
versus new politics (Dalton 2002), the interest versus values (Tavits and Potter 
2015), the left/right versus libertarian/authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994), the 
left/right versus GAL/TAN dimensions (Hooghe et al 2002), the cultural 
versus economic demarcation and integration dimensions (Kriesi et al. 2006, 
2008) or the left/right versus populism-liberal cosmopolitanism (Inglehart and 
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Norris 2016) for example. What these diverse labels have in common is that 
they rely on a general distinction between a largely economic dimension and 
largely non-economic dimension. While the content of the economic dimension 
is more or less clear and relates to collective questions about state intervention 
in the economy (for a critique see De Vries et al. 2013), the content of the non-
economic dimension is much more diverse. For some it relates primarily to 
societal value divides based on tradition, religion, sexuality or the 
environment, for others it also relates to migration or European integration.  
 The different emphasis may in part come from a time-specific focus. 
Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues (2006, 2008) in their seminal work on the 
topic for example suggest that the content of the cultural dimension has 
changed in recent years. While “[i]n 1970s this dimension was dominated by 
issues linked to cultural liberalism”, “[o]ver the following decades, new issues 
have been integrated” and “[t]he most important of these [being] 
immigration.” (Kriesi et al. 2006: 950). Marks and colleagues (2006) suggest 
that the second dimension is also context-specific. Important differences exist 
between Western and Central-Eastern Europe for example. 
 The linkage to issues of European integration has also become a matter 
of contention. While conflict over Europe was initially seen as largely 
independent of the dominant dimensions of political conflict (Gabel and 
Anderson 2002; Hix and Lord 1997), in the early 2000s authors suggested that 
issues regarding European integration were linked to the left–right dimension 
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albeit not in a straightforward way (Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks and Wilson 
2000). Within this literature, the relationship between left-right placement and 
support for European integration is described as the ‘inverted U-curve’ 
(Hooghe et al. 2002: 968). The inverted U-curve indicates that parties of the 
ideological mainstream, i.e. conservative, social and Christian democratic, are 
generally supportive of the integration process, as they have frequently been 
part of governing coalitions throughout Western Europe and were therefore 
largely responsible for the course of integration. Extreme left- and right-wing 
extremist parties, however, most strongly oppose it, albeit for different 
reasons (Hooghe et al. 2002, De Vries and Edwards 2009). While left-wing 
extremist parties oppose integration in Europe on the basis of the neoliberal 
character of the project and its negative influence on the welfare state, the 
extreme right opposes intra-EU migration and aim to protect national 
sovereignty (De Vries and Edwards 2009). More recent approaches suggest 
that party stances towards immigration, the EU and international trade have 
been subsumed in a transnational cleavage which has its focal point in ‘the 
defense of national political, social, and economic ways of life against external 
actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods, or exerting 
rule.’ (Hooghe and Marks 2017: 3).  
 This quick review of the literature on party positioning suggests that 
scholars argue that political space is likely two-dimensional in nature 
consisting of a relatively stable economic left-right dimension and a second 
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dimension of which the issue content is highly flexible both across countries 
and within countries over time. The issues relating to immigration and 
European integration have been identified as the key drivers of change in 
dimensionality in recent years. Yet, the way in which these issues are linked 
with, or in fact orthogonal to, the economic left-right is a matter of extensive 
scholarly debate. Moreover, this is likely to differ across countries based on 
institutional characteristics that affect party and electoral competition, and 
specific societal conditions and events, such as levels of immigration for 
example. Ultimately, the question of how the issues of European integration 
and immigration fit onto existing dimensions of party competition is an 
empirical one. Here I examine the way both issues are linked to the economic 
left-right dimension in the Netherlands.    
 Figure 1 below plots the positions of Dutch political parties on an 
economic left-right dimension (x-axis) and a European integration dimension 
(y-axis). The party positions are based on expert placements of parties using 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend file that asked experts to place 
parties on a 11 point left-right scale ranging 0) ‘extreme left’ to 100 extreme 
right as well as a 7-point European integration scale ranging from 1) ‘least 
supportive’ to 7) ‘most supportive’ (Bakker et al. 2015). The data was collected 
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at five points in time 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 for 10 parties in total.5 
The parties included are: 1) the conservative liberal VVD (Volkspartij voor 
Vrijheid en Democratie), 2) the Christian democratic CDA (Christen 
Democratic Appel), 3) the social democratic PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid), 4) 
the liberal D66 (Democraten 66), 5) the Green GL (Groen Links), 6) the 
socialist SP (Socialist Party), 7) the confessional CU (Christen Unie), 8) the 
confessional SGP (Staatskundig Gereformeerde Partij), 9) the populist PPV 
(Partij van de Vrijheid), and 10) the animal rights party PvdD (Partij van de 
Dieren).  
 
 
                                                        
5 Experts were also asked to place parties in 1982, 1988, 1992 and 1996, yet 
these were mostly retrospective placements which raises some issues of 
measurement validity (Ray 1999).  
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Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile. 
 
Figure 1: The economic left-right and European integration positions of 
political parties in the Netherlands, 2006-2014 
 
The figure suggests that while the relationship between a party’s economic 
left-right and EU position between 1999 and 2006 somewhat resembles an 
inverted U-curve whereby centrist parties are most pro-EU and extremist 
parties most anti, this relationship starts to unravel by 2010 and 2014. In the 
latter period, we find that parties are pretty much evenly distributed across 
the four quadrants. While the positions of some parties, like the D66, PvdA, 
VVD or SP, have remained quite stable over the period, others display much 
more change. For example, while the GL’s left-right position has not changed 
much, the party has become more strongly pro-EU. In fact, by 2014 it is with 
D66 the most pro-EU party in the Dutch system. We see an opposite 
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movement for the PVV. While the party has always taken a very strong anti-
EU position, it has moved to a more centrist, or even left of centre, position on 
the economic left-right dimension. Indeed, the party has aimed to defend its 
anti-immigrant position in part based on parochial altruism. Specifically, it 
wants to protect the generosity of the Dutch welfare state by denying benefits 
to immigrants or foreign-born citizens. When we inspect the relationship 
between parties economic left-right and European integration position by 
exploring the explained variance of a regression model that includes both 
parties’ left-right positions and a squared term to be sensitive to the non-
linear nature of the relationship, see table 2, we find a strong co-variation 
between a party’s left-right and European integration position until 2006. This 
relationship is virtually non-existent after 2010.   
 
Table 2: Relationship between left-right and European integration position 
 1999 2002 2006 2010 2014 
R2 including linear 
and curvilinear 
term 
 
0.48 
 
0.45 
 
0.52 
 
0.04 
 
0.07 
N 8 8 8 10 10 
Notes: Table entries are R2 coefficients of an ordinary regression model that includes both a 
party’s economic left-right position and the position squared. The European integration 
variable ranges from 1 against more integration to 7 for more integration, and the economic 
left-right variable from 0 left to 10 right.  
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile. 
 
What about the relationship between parties’ economic left-right and 
immigration positions? Figure 2 presents similar information to the previous 
figure, namely expert placements of Dutch political parties, but this time it 
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combines expert assessments of parties’ economic left-right and immigration 
positions. Party’s stances on immigration are like the left-right measured on 
an 11-point scale ranging from 1) ‘against a restriction of immigration’ to 10) 
‘in favour of a restriction’. Interestingly, we find a rather weak relationship 
between a party’s position on the left-right and its position on immigration. 
While in 2006 there seems to be a relationship between the two, more right-
wing parties are more in favour of restricting immigration, while more left-
wing parties are against; by 2014 this relationship seems to have disappeared. 
We find parties with clear left or right positions combining them with clearly 
pro- or anti- immigration restriction positions.  
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Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile. 
 
Figure 2: The economic left-right and immigration positions of political 
parties in the Netherlands, 2006-2014 
 
 
The only quadrant where parties are not strongly represented is the left and 
immigration restriction one. Two parties are closest to occupying this 
quadrant by 2014, namely the SP and PVV. While the PVV has always been in 
favour of restricting immigration, they have made a clear move from right to 
left in economic terms. The SP remains left-wing over the entire time period, 
but takes on a more centrist or even anti-immigration position in 2010. Part of 
this seems to be picking up on the somewhat difficult relationship the party 
has with immigration. While it is in favour of accepting refugees who face 
political or religious prosecution, it has ever since the publication of the report 
“Guest workers and Capital” in 1983, taken a sceptical position towards 
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labour migration. The report was especially controversial at the time as the 
party suggested that foreign workers should be offered money in exchange 
for returning to their country of origin (SP 1983). Ever since this time, it has 
remained critical of labour migration. Most other left parties, perhaps with 
the exception of the PvdA in 2010, hold much more pro-immigration 
positions.  
When we examine the relationship between parties’ left-right and 
immigration positions further by means of bivariate correlations which are 
presented in table 3, we find that while in 2006 a party’s left-right position is 
correlated with its immigration position (see also De Vries et al. 2013), this 
relationship weakens in 2010 and 2014 and is no longer statistically 
significant. Like in the case of parties’ positioning towards European 
integration, party stances on immigration have become more independent of 
parties’ left-right positions.  
 
Table 3: Relationship between left-right and immigration position 
 2006 2010 2014 
Left-right 
position 
0.80* 
(0.02) 
0.54 
(0.11) 
0.48 
(0.16) 
N 8 10 10 
Notes: Table entries are Pearson’s R correlation coefficients with p-values in parentheses. The 
immigration variable ranges from 0 against a restriction of immigration to 10 in favour of a 
restriction of immigration, and the economic left-right variable from 0 left to 10 right.  
* significant at p≤0.05. 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile. 
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How has the relationship between party positions on European 
integration and immigration developed? Table 4 provides results of bivariate 
correlation analyses where we correlate a party’s position on European 
integration with its immigration position. Interestingly, the results show that 
in 2010 and 2014 there is a significant relationship between positions on both 
issues. Specifically, we find that when a party becomes more in favour of 
restricting immigration, it coincides with a more Eurosceptic stance. So, while 
both European integration and immigration positions became more 
independent from parties’ left-right positions, the positions of parties on these 
issues have become linked over time.   
 
Table 4: Relationship between immigration and European integration 
position 
 2006 2010 2014 
Immigration 
Position 
-0.62 
(0.10) 
-0.69* 
(0.02) 
-0.62* 
(0.05) 
N 8 10 10 
Notes: Table entries are Pearson’s R correlation coefficients with p-values in parentheses. The 
European integration variable ranges from 1 against European integration to 7 in favor of 
European integration, immigration variable ranges from 0 against a restriction of 
immigration to 10 in favour of a restriction of immigration. 
* significant at p≤0.05. 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile. 
 
 
Do parties also place importance on the issues of European integration and 
immigration? Figure 3 shows the average level of salience a Dutch party 
attaches of the European integration measured between 1999 and 2014 on a 1-
10 scale (1 indicating ‘low salience’ and 10 ‘high’). The figure suggests that 
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there has been a slight increase in the importance parties place on the 
European integration issue. By 2014, the salience of European integration for 
an average Dutch party places is 6 points on a 10 point scale. Unfortunately, 
the CHES dataset only includes salience measures for immigration in two 
time points, 2006 and 2010, but also here the average salience is a little over 6 
points on 10 points scale. This indicates that both issues by the mid-2000s are 
of significant importance to Dutch political parties. 
 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile. 
 
Figure 3: The salience of the European Integration Issue Averaged across 
Dutch political parties, 1999-2014 
 
 
The results thus far suggest that party positioning on the issues of European 
integration and immigration in the Netherlands has become linked over time 
and at the same time more distinct from party positioning on the economic 
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left-right. Moreover, parties attach great importance to both issues. All in all, 
it seems to suggest that by 2014, Dutch party competition is characterized by a 
second dimension relating to the country’s openness to foreigners and foreign 
influence. I coin this second dimension the cosmopolitan-parochial divide as it 
pits cosmopolitan parties on the left and right, like the GL or D66, that 
advocate an inclusionary and international outlook against parochial parties 
on the left and right that are increasingly wary of open borders and 
international political influence, such as the SP or the PVV. Merton (1968) 
describes a cosmopolitan attitude as a more open, global orientation 
displaying a higher interest in, and awareness of, distant events. This is 
opposed to a more local or parochial attitude that is more inward looking (see 
also Vertovec and Cohen 2002).  
 How does this cosmopolitan-parochial divide differ from other 
existing conceptualizations in the literature? Kriesi and his colleagues (2006, 
2008) for example refer to a similar set of issues as the integration-
demarcation dimension, while Hooghe and Marks (2017) denote it the 
transnational cleavage. My approach differs from these existing perspectives 
in important ways. Hooghe and Marks view the transnational cleavage as the 
new vocal point of party competition, while Kriesi and colleagues suggest 
that issues relating to economic and cultural globalization have redefined the 
content of the economic and non-economic dimensions. Both sets of authors 
stress that socio-structural change, critical junctures and public demand have 
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shifted the main axis of competition and changed the content of political 
competition on both dimensions. What I argue here is that political space in 
the Netherlands is increasingly two-dimensional in nature, and that these two 
dimensions have become largely orthogonal from each other. While one 
dimension relates to issues of redistribution, state intervention in the 
economy and (re-) allocation of resources, the other refers to questions of who 
belongs to the polity and how much influence outside actors, like 
supranational organizations, should have on law-making. These two 
dimensions are what Kitschelt and Rehm (2015) refer to as the ‘group’ and 
‘greed’ dimension. 6  I am not necessarily arguing that we are witnessing 
political change based on the fact that transnational or globalization issues 
that have come to redefine the main axis of competition or both the economic 
and non-economic dimension, but rather that the two dimensions have 
become cross-cutting. The significance of the classical economic left-right 
dimension in party and electoral competition remains strong and centers on 
much the same issues as in the past. What we are seeing is not a shift in the 
main dimension of competition, but rather the development of four distinct 
blocks of competition, namely the cosmopolitan-left, the cosmopolitan-right, 
the parochial-left and the parochial-right.  
                                                        
6 The third grid dimension that the authors outline, relates to moral topics 
does not strongly come to the fore in Dutch politics in 2014, see Table 5 
especially. This dimension may only play a role for the small Christian parties 
like the CU or SGP. 
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I develop an empirical measure of parties’ cosmopolitan versus 
parochial stances by combining their positions on European integration and 
immigration.7 Figure 4 below plots parties’ cosmopolitan versus parochial 
stances against their economic left-right stances. While only the SP, SGP and 
PVV consistently fall in the left-parochial or right-parochial quadrants, parties 
like the CU or VVD do in 2006, but move to more centrist positions in 2010 
and 2014. The clearest examples of left-cosmopolitan and right-cosmopolitan 
parties are the GL and D66 respectively. The 2017 election result that showed 
significant gains for the most parochial party (PVV) and most cosmopolitan 
ones (GL and D66) fits these patterns of change. Now we turn to the question 
if the cosmopolitan-parochial divide also characterizes voters’ positions and 
their behaviour in elections.  
                                                        
7 I transform the European integration scale from a 7 to 11-point scale where 
higher values mean more sceptical positions, and subsequently create an 
additive scale that I divide by 2.  
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Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile. 
 
Figure 4: Party positions on the economic left-right and cosmopolitan-
parochial divide, 2006-2014 
 
 
4. The Cosmopolitan-Parochial Divide and Voter Decision-Making 
 
In order to explore if Dutch voters’ issue positions resemble those of parties, 
we explore the dimensionality of people’s stances on a number of issues. We 
do so by using a battery of issue positions questions that was included in the 
most recent round of the European Election Study (EES) from 2014 (Schmitt et 
al. 2016). The questions tapping into people’s left-right, European integration 
and immigration positions are identical in wording to those included in the 
CHES data that I relied on in the previous section. It also includes more 
questions concerning people’s stances on redistribution, same-sex marriage, 
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privacy protection and climate change. All items were measured on an 11-
point scale and coded in such a way that higher values reflect more right and 
conservative positions. To explore the potential dimensionality underlying 
these issues, I performed a Mokken scaling analysis and the results are 
presented in table 5 below (Van Schuur 2003). 
 
Table 5: Dimensionality of voters’ positions 
 Scale 1 
H-coefficients 
Scale 2 
H-coefficients 
Left-right position 0.42 
 
 
Anti-redistribution 
position 
0.42  
Anti-European 
integration position 
 0.45 
 
National control 
position 
 0.42 
Anti-immigration 
position 
 0.34 
Scale H-coefficient 0.42 0.34 
 1065 
Notes: The standard criteria was used to form a scale, namely Hik>.3. People’s positions on 
privacy, same-sex marriage and climate change did not meet the criterion to form a scale or 
be included in one.  
Source: European Election Study 2014. 
 
The results from the Mokken scaling analysis suggest that two dimensions 
emerge from the data, one economic left-right dimension tapping into 
people’s left-right and redistribution positions as well as a cosmopolitan-
parochial dimension reflecting people’s stances on European integration, 
national control in international politics and immigration. These dimensions 
are only weakly related, the Pearson’s R correlation coefficient is 0.2 (p=.00). 
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These findings are in line with recent scholarship on public opinion towards 
economic globalization in Europe and beyond that suggests that popular 
opposition is motivated by cosmopolitanism and other-regarding preferences 
(Margalit 2012, Bechtel et al. 2014, Kuhn et al. 2017) or support for foreign aid 
is driven by paternalistic considerations and prejudices (Baker 2015).  
Interestingly, items tapping people’s views about privacy, same-sex 
marriage and climate change do not load onto the second dimension or form 
a separate dimension themselves. This finding runs counter recent cross-
national work suggesting that the second dimension is largely cultural in 
nature (most notably Inglehart and Norris 2011, 2016). For Dutch voters this 
does not necessarily seem to be the case. Cultural liberal stances about same-
sex marriage for example are not part of the cosmopolitan-parochial divide.  
 How much do people’s stances on the cosmopolitan-parochial divide 
affect their vote choice? In order for people’s stances on the cosmopolitan-
parochial divide to matter, people need to care about these issues vis-á-vis 
economic left-right issues, and they need to find these issues important 
enough to influence their behaviour at the ballot box (De Vries 2007, 2018). I 
examine this in two steps. First, I explore the salience people attach to issues 
relating to the economic left-right and cosmopolitan-parochial divide, and 
second, I explore how people’s positions on these dimensions affect their vote 
for parties in national and European parliamentary elections. Figure 5 
presents an overview of the importance supporters of different Dutch political 
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parties attach to issues relating to the economic left-right dimension, 
unemployment and pensions, and those relating to the cosmopolitan-
parochial dimension, powers of EU institutions, the Euro and immigration. 
These responses are based on questions asking people what the most 
important problems are that face the Netherlands today. The figure includes 
supporters of all parties that were discussed in the previous section as well as 
the pensioners’ party 50Plus.  
 
 
Source: European Election Study 2014. 
 
Figure 5: Importance of economic left-right and cosmopolitan-parochial 
issues among Dutch voters 
 
 
The results show that both sets of issues are important, but that for Dutch 
voters EU powers and unemployment were the most important. The only 
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exception here is the voters of the 50Plus party for whom pensions was the 
most important issue. Although one needs to be sensitive to the fact that the 
survey was conducted in the context of the 2014 EP elections so the 
importance of EU issues might be somewhat inflated, issues relating to 
European integration have clearly gained in importance in Dutch politics in 
recent years given in response to the Eurozone crisis and Brexit decision in 
the United Kingdom (De Vries 2017, 2018). 
 Another way to examine if voters view their stances on the 
cosmopolitan-parochial dimension as important is by examining the extent to 
which they impact people’s decision making at the ballot box.  Tables 6A and 
6B present results from multinomial logistic regression analyses of people’s 
recall of their vote choices in the 2014 EP election (EP vote) and the 2012 
national parliamentary elections (NP vote). In order to capture the effect of 
people’s stances on the economic left-right and cosmopolitan-parochial 
dimensions, I use the items that scaled together on both dimensions as shown 
in table 5, and added and divided them by the number of items included 1 to 
form one scale ranging from 0 left/cosmopolitan and 10 right/parochial 
respectively. Party choice for the biggest incumbent party, the VVD, serves as 
the reference category in the analysis and all models include the following 
individual level covariates which are not shown here: government approval, 
retrospective economic evaluations, age, gender, education, unemployed, 
working class self identification, self employed, professional worker and 
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trade union membership. This analysis is able to point at correlations between 
stated party choice and issue positions, but issues of causality remain. That is 
to say do people vote for certain parties due to their issue preferences or the 
reverse?. 
 
Table 6A: Relationship between people’s economic left-right and 
cosmopolitan-parochial positions and vote choice in 2014 European 
Parliament election 
EP vote CDA PvdA SP GL PVV CU/SGP D66 
Economic Left-
Right 
-0.62* 
(0.12) 
-1.48* 
(0.15) 
-1.77* 
(0.15) 
-1.62* 
(0.16) 
-0.73* 
(0.15) 
-0.62* 
(0.14) 
-0.80* 
(0.12) 
Cosmopolitanism- 
Parochial 
0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.19 
(0.12) 
0.35* 
(0.12) 
-0.36* 
(0.13) 
0.74* 
(0.14) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
-0.28* 
(0.10) 
Individual Level 
Covariates 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
EP vote PvdD 50Plus 
Economic Left-
Right 
-1.51* 
(0.19) 
-0.98* 
(0.19) 
Cosmopolitanism- 
Nationalism 
0.38* 
(0.15) 
0.27 
(0.17) 
Individual Level 
Covariates 
✓ ✓ 
LR Chi2 742.93* 
Pseudo R2 0.24 
N 686 
Notes: Table entries are multinomial regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at the p<.05.  Vote for the VVD is the reference category. The 
following individual level covariates were included: government approval, retrospective 
economic evaluations, age, gender, education, unemployed, working class self identification, 
self employed, professional worker and trade union membership.  
Source: European Election Study 2014. 
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Table 6B: Relationship between people’s economic left-right and 
cosmopolitan-parochial positions and vote choice in previous national 
election 
NP vote CDA PvdA SP GL PVV CU D66 
Economic Left-
Right 
-0.33* 
(0.10) 
-1.27* 
(0.10) 
-1.56* 
(0.12) 
-1.41* 
(0.13) 
-0.75* 
(0.12) 
-0.64* 
(0.13) 
-0.65* 
(0.09) 
Cosmopolitan- 
Parochial 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
-0.26* 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.30* 
(0.11) 
0.40* 
(0.10) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.27* 
(0.07) 
Individual Level 
Covariates 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
NP vote PvdD 50Plus SGP 
Economic Left-
Right 
-1.05* 
(0.19) 
-1.05* 
(0.21) 
-0.21 
(0.17) 
Cosmopolitan- 
Parochial 
0.16 
(0.16) 
0.27 
(0.20) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
Individual Level 
Covariates 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
LR Chi2 857.63 
Pseudo R2 0.22 
N 912 
Notes: Table entries are multinomial regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at the p<.05.  Vote for the VVD is the reference category. The 
following individual level covariates were included: government approval, retrospective 
economic evaluations, age, gender, education, unemployed, working class self identification, 
self employed, professional worker and trade union membership.  
Source: European Election Study 2014. 
 
The results suggest that people’s cosmopolitan-parochial positions indeed 
matter for both vote choice in EP and national elections. People’s stances on 
the cosmopolitan-parochial divide are especially important for those stating 
that they voted for the GL or D66 versus the VVD or the PVV versus the VVD. 
These findings dovetail with some of the findings documented for parties in 
the previous sections, as the GL and D66 versus the PVV constitute the poles 
of the cosmopolitan-parochial divide. Does the inclusion of people’s 
cosmopolitan-parochial positions improve the model of vote choice? I test this 
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by relying on a likelihood-ratio test that examines if the full model, the one 
that includes cosmopolitan-parochial positions, is an improvement of a 
restricted model that only includes left-right placements and individual level 
controls. The likelihood-ratio tests suggests that both for EP and NP vote the 
inclusion of voter’s positions on the second dimension significantly improves 
the model, but the improvement is bigger for vote choice in EP elections (LR 
test (EPVote)=123.11, p=.00/LR test (NPvote)=88.11, p=.00).  
 Overall, this evidence suggests that the dimensionality of Dutch voters’ 
issue positions closely mimics those of parties. Two dimensions are crucial for 
understanding how the average Dutch voter views the political world and 
decides which party to support, the economic left-right and cosmopolitan-
parochial dimensions. Both of these dimensions matter to voters in how they 
position themselves politically. Interestingly, we find that in the Netherlands 
people’s views about gay and lesbian rights or the environment are not linked 
to the second dimension. This finding perhaps reflects the fact that parties like 
the PVV for example champion their anti-immigration and anti-Islam 
positions as a defence of Dutch liberal values of tolerance towards gays and 
lesbians as well as women’s rights.8 This Dutch evidence goes counter some 
recent work suggesting that the recent rise of populism constitutes largely a 
popular backlash against cultural liberalism (Inglehart and Norris 2016). This 
                                                        
8 See also http://www.elsevier.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2017/03/kandidaat-
partij-simons-wilders-gebruikt-homos-als-wapen-463254/ . 
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may be the case for recent developments in the United States or Poland for 
example, but does not generalize to some countries in Western Europe, like 
the Netherlands. This context-specificity of the second dimension is an 
important topic for future research.  
In a final step, I examine the nature of people’s stances on the 
cosmopolitan-parochial divide further by exploring an alternative explanation 
for what drives people’s views on this divide, namely economic uncertainty. 
This perspective does not so much understand the development of a 
cosmopolitan-parochial divide as a cultural backlash against liberalism, such 
as the extension of women’s rights or protection of gay and lesbian or ethnic 
minority rights, but stresses more the economic nature of it. Increasing 
transnational political and economic cooperation has made a large segment of 
the population feel more economically insecure (Hacker 2006, Hacker et al. 
2013). As a result, people feel left behind by globalization and that political 
elites no longer look out for them. People support political outsiders who 
skilfully articulate their fears about globalization linked to their economic 
situation and skill competition by immigrants. In his book the Globalization 
Paradox, Dani Rodrik (2011) for example argues globalization presents a 
trilemma as societies cannot be globally integrated, completely sovereign and 
democratic at the same time. Using this type of reasoning, deeper economic 
integration accompanied by further political integration in Europe would 
likely lead to resistance amongst the most vulnerable demanding a fair 
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distribution of wealth and jobs, an increase in trade protectionism and for 
their government to take back control. International market integration 
favours citizens with higher levels of human capital, such as education and 
occupational skills, and income (Gabel 1998, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, 
Fordham 2008). The Brexit vote in the United Kingdom has been attributed to 
a revolt of those left behind by globalization for example (Goodwin and 
Heath 2016, Hobolt 2016, Clarke et al. 2017).  
I examine the economic insecurity explanation in the Dutch context by 
exploring if those who were hardest hit in the Eurozone crisis also display a 
higher level of parochialism and a greater likelihood to support parochial 
parties in the Dutch political landscape, like the PVV or SP. The crisis could 
have influenced citizens in many different ways, but most significant was a 
loss of employment in the household and/or a significant reduction in 
household income. Of course, those who experience such loss are not a 
randomly drawn from the population. They mostly already find themselves 
in a precarious economic position. In order to control for this, the analysis 
relies on a matching technique. This is a means by which to isolate the effect 
of being adversely affected by the crisis by matching respondents on a whole 
set of demographic variables. We employ the nearest-neighbour matching 
(NN matching) as an optimization method for finding the closest (or most 
similar) individuals. Closeness is expressed in terms of a dissimilarity 
function: the less similar the individuals, the larger the function values (Rubin 
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1973). It selects for each treated individual the control individual with the 
smallest distance from the treated individual. By using NN matching we are 
able to estimate the effect of being adversely affected by the crisis by 
accounting for the covariates that predict the likelihood of being affected like 
employment status, level of education, age, occupational skills and gender.  
The 2014 EES survey includes a question asking people if they 
experienced a loss in employment or reduction in household during the last 
24 months. In order to examine if people who were adversely affected by the 
crisis are more likely to hold parochial attitudes, we create a variable that 
takes on a value of 1 when people experienced a job loss or reduction in 
household income and 0 if they did not. We examine the effect of being 
adversely affected by the crisis on two outcome variables: a) people’s 
cosmopolitan-parochial positions ranging from 0) ‘cosmopolitan’ to 10) 
‘parochial’, and b) vote for parochial parties in the last national election coded 
as 1) if a person voted for the PVV, SP or SGP in the last national election, and 
0) for another party.  
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Table 7: The effect of economic loss on cosmopolitan-parochial positions and 
vote for parochial parties 
 Cosmopolitan-
Parochial Positions 
Vote for Parochial 
Parties 
Adversely Affected by 
Crisis 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Matched on Individual 
Level Covariates 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
N 1070 1001 
Notes: Table entries are OLS regression coefficients from based on a NN-matching procedure 
with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in the second column ranges 
from 0 cosmopolitan to 10 parochial, and in the third column from 1 vote for parochial party 
(PVV, SP or SGP) in the previous national election, 0 vote for other party. * significant at 
p≤0.05. 
Source: European Election Study 2014. 
 
Table 7 presents the results. The results indicate that being adversely affected 
by the crisis makes Dutch voters more parochial, a quarter of a point on a 11-
point scale. Moreover, being affected by the crisis increases the likelihood of a 
Dutch voter voting for a parochial party. These results seem to suggest that 
among Dutch voters economic loss is a big driver of scepticism towards 
immigration, European integration or international cooperation more 
broadly. This evidence suggests that we ought to be careful to depict recent 
rise in parochialism as motivated predominantly by cultural fears (see also 
Rae Berg et al. 2017).  
In fact, when we examine the individual level characteristics of those 
who are more parochial versus more cosmopolitan more in-depth, here 
presented in table 8, two factors stand out: education and the degree to which 
people worry about having enough money at the end of the month. 
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Interestingly, people’s level of national attachment does not correlate with 
people’s stances on the cosmopolitan-parochial dimension. It is the lower 
educated and financially worried who are more likely to display parochial 
views compared to those with higher education and less financial worries.   
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Table 8: Correlates of cosmopolitan-parochial positions 
 Parochial-Cosmopolitan 
Positions 
Education -0.74* 
(0.10) 
Financial worry 0.25* 
(0.11) 
National attachment 
 
-0.11 
(0.12) 
Age  
 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
Gender 
 
0.08 
(0.01) 
Working class 
identification 
0.26 
(0.39) 
Employed  
 
0.08 
(0.26) 
Professional worker 
 
-0.11 
(0.21) 
Self-employed  
 
-0.14 
(0.41) 
Urban residence 
 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
Trade union 
membership 
0.09 
0.13 
Constant 
 
8.43* 
(0.64) 
R2 0.07 
N 1070 
Notes: Table entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable ranges from 0 cosmopolitan to 10 parochial. * significant at p≤0.05. 
Source: European Election Study 2014. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that we need to be careful about these types 
of correlations as it might be the case that wealthier voters may experience 
greater social pressures to appear less prejudiced and more cosmopolitan as a 
consequence of social desirability bias in answering surveys (An 2015), these 
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results together with the ones presented in table 7 suggest that in the 
Netherlands people’s cosmopolitan-parochial views might be driven more by 
economic insecurities than a backlash against cultural liberalism. This is 
further supported by earlier findings reported here that suggested that 
people’s opinions about culturally liberal issues such as same-sex marriage, 
privacy or climate change are largely unrelated to people’s stances on the 
cosmopolitan-parochial divide. In the Netherlands, the cosmopolitan-
parochial divide might be more the result of people fearing and experiences 
negative side effects of international political and economic cooperation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The Brexit vote, the election of Donald Trump, and the electoral success of 
populist forces across the globe seem indicative of a backlash against 
economic and political cooperation across borders. The 2017 election outcome 
in the Netherlands also saw gains for the party of the anti-Islam and anti-EU 
political entrepreneur, Geert Wilders. Yet, his Party for Freedom did not do as 
well as the polls had initially indicated, and more progressive and pro-EU 
forces, mostly notably the Greens, made enormous electoral strides. What 
does this result tell us about patterns of party and electoral competition in the 
Netherlands and perhaps in Europe more broadly? 
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 This article uncovers important trends in political competition in the 
Netherlands over the past two decades and aims to place them in a larger 
context of the rise of so-called populist forces. It highlights three specific 
trends in Dutch politics. First, questions of migration, European integration 
and international cooperation, next to economic left-right issues, have become 
more central to party and voter polarization. Second, party and polarization 
over these issues has more distinct from polarization on the economic left-
right, and resembles a cosmopolitan-parochial divide pitting parties and 
voters with a more inclusionary and international outlook on both the left and 
right, against parochial parties and voters on both the left and right that that 
aim to tame international influences and are increasingly suspicious of open 
borders. Positions on cosmopolitanism-parochial divide now structure 
people’s party choice in both European and national parliamentary elections 
in the Netherlands, especially for parties that are clearly parochial (like the 
party of Wilders) or clearly cosmopolitan (like the Greens). That said, for most 
Dutch voters the economic left-right remains the key focal point. Third and 
finally, this second dimension in Dutch politics seems less the result of a 
popular backlash against cultural liberalism, but more a consequence of 
economic insecurity.  
 This study highlights that Dutch political parties often described as 
populist, the Socialist Party and Party for Freedom, display similarities in that 
they are both vocal opponents of cosmopolitanism. Interestingly, by 2014 
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Geert Wilders’ party is economically more on the left and right, hence 
resembling the issue positions of the Socialist party even more. Indeed, the 
Party for Freedom clashed with the minority government it supported from 
parliament between 2010 and 2012 over cuts in social benefits.9 The opposite 
pole on the cosmopolitan-parochial divide is inhabited by the Green Left and 
Liberal Democats (D66). These parties increasingly differentiate themselves 
from their mainstream left and right competitors, like the Labour Party 
(PvdA) or Conservative Liberals (VVD), based on their pro-immigration and 
pro-EU stances.  
The growing importance of cosmopolitan-parochial divide in Dutch 
politics seems to reflect people’s views about how to cope in an increasingly 
globalized world (see also Kriesi et al. 2008). The analysis uncovers that 
positions of voters on the cosmopolitan-parochial divide are not so much 
related to their views on same-sex marriage or the environment, but reflect 
their experiences in the recent Eurozone crisis. Those who were hardest hit 
turned to parochial parties, on the left or right, and displayed less 
cosmopolitan positions compared to those who were not affected.  
Given that the cosmopolitan-parochial divide is largely unrelated to 
economic left-right, we have witnessed parties traditionally associated with 
the extreme left and right in Dutch politics, the Socialist Party and Party for 
                                                        
9 See https://www.npofocus.nl/artikel/7493/waarom-mislukte-regeren-met-
pvv-steun (accessed 24th of April 2017). 
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Freedom respectively, now representing and catering towards very similar 
clienteles. This does not seem to be an entirely Dutch phenomenon. There are 
clear similarities between the parochial stances of the Left Party and 
Alternative for Germany in Germany, or French presidential candidates Le 
Pen and Melenchon. Although the parochial left and right parties/candidates 
differ on many respects, they share scepticism towards the policy direction of 
the EU and/or labour migration. It is an important area of future research to 
aim to delve deeper into understanding the shared rhetoric of parochial left 
and right parties. A recent study by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) constitutes 
an important starting point.  
Yet, there are surely limits to how much we can generalize from these 
Dutch results. While in the Netherlands opposition to cultural liberalism is 
not the core of the cosmopolitan-parochial divide, in other European 
countries cultural issues might be more important. Here, we can think of 
countries like Poland for example. Moreover, Dutch politics is characterized 
by an extremely low electoral threshold that allows for the parliamentary 
representation of many parties. Arguably, this is a very favourable context for 
the development of a largely orthogonal second dimension where different 
types of parties, left-parochial, right-parochial, left-cosmopolitan and right-
cosmopolitan, emerge. In countries where electoral rules are less permissive, 
like the United Kingdom for example, and not many parties are represented 
in parliament, voters will need to make important trade-offs at election time. 
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They will need to decide how much they care about their economic left-right 
positions versus their cosmopolitan-parochial ones. As a result, rifts are likely 
to characterize both parties as well as their core supporters. This might be 
exactly what we are witnessing in post-Brexit Britain.  
Finally, the content of the second dimension may crucially dependent 
on the strategic choices of political entrepreneurs, both within existing parties 
and in new ones (Hobolt and De Vries 2015). They can try to contain the 
potentially disruptive force of people’s cosmopolitan or parochial concerns by 
linking them closely to their economic left-right positioning, or they can try to 
distinguish themselves from mainstream competitors by carving out the 
differences with economic positions. Future elections in Europe are likely to 
be shaped by these centrifugal and centripetal forces.    
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